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This paper looks at short employment spells in three European countries: the UK, whose 
labour market is considered the most flexible in the EU; Italy, regarded as the least flexible; 
and Germany, tightly regulated, but characterised by a deservedly famous apprenticeship 
system. In particular, it aims to assess whether young people in short-lived jobs stand a better 
chance of finding a “good job” compared to their older colleagues. The increasingly held 
belief that - in modern economies - a “bad job” at the beginning of one's career is the “port-of-
entry” to stable employment and to upward mobility, makes this assessment particularly 
relevant; i.e. it matters greatly if short-duration jobs are entry ports into better employment or 
become long term-traps. The lack of accepted benchmarks makes it difficult to reach strong 
conclusions in regard to the 'efficiency' of labour markets: cross-country comparisons help to 
highlight the effect of different labour market institutions on mobility and on the soundness of 
the “port-of-entry” hypothesis. 
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It seems that nowadays, in the late Nineties, the chance for a young worker of moving into a 
permanent job after a period spent in one or many temporary jobs is high compared to that of 
a young worker who has spent the same amount of time in unemployment. Once upon a time - 
say in the Seventies - holding onto a temporary job or queuing among the unemployed made 
little difference for youth aiming at a permanent job. This increasingly held belief - that a “bad 
job” at the beginning of one's career is the “port-of-entry” to stable employment and to 
upward mobility - has relevant policy implications and needs to be carefully tested. 
The increasing popularity of the port-of-entry hypotheses is consequential to the, by-now, 
accepted idea that there is a certain degree of segmentation in the labour markets of the 
western world, although the wording segmentation may be no longer fashionable. Those who 
are “in” are more protected than those who are “out”. All modern theories of employment and 
long-term unemployment (insider/outsider, union wage, hysteresis, indirectly also the theory 
of implicit contracts) point in that direction. This implies that long-term employed are 
supposed to be the most protected ones, unemployed the least ones, and people alternating 
temporary jobs and unemployment spells to be somewhere in between. 
The OECD (Employment Outlook, 1998, Chapter 3) addresses this point focusing on the first 
employment spell after completing education, and concludes its statistical analysis writing that 
“... starting off in the labour market as unemployed, regardless of one’s level of education, 
almost “guarantees” employment problems in the future. In this context, the role of 
temporary jobs in easing the initial transition [from school to the labour market] is of some 
interest.... But there is also a downside to temporary jobs: some never make the transition to 
permanent jobs and some bounce back and forth between temporary contracts and 
unemployment”.
1  
Furthermore, a cursory look at aggregate indicators of youth unemployment and employment 
inflows is very supportive of the port-of-entry hypothesis, aside and in addition to the 
authority of those who have discussed it in recent times
2. 
On the other hand, a micro-based test of this hypothesis is needed to disentangle the effects of 
individual self-selection from the effect of labour market segmentation (“stigma”) to assess 
the effectiveness of public policies aimed at fighting unemployment.  
In particular, the focus of this paper is the downside of temporary jobs on which the OECD 
draws attention, namely the transition from short employment spells to “better” jobs. The role 
of the German apprenticeship system will also emerge in this study. We propose a simple 
                                                 
1 The Employment Outlook (1998) continues as follows: “... low skilled French youth employed on a temporary 
contract during their first year out of school are both less likely to be in a job six years later and, if working, less 
likely to have a permanent contract compared with those who started in a permanent job. But [...] they do 
considerably better than the unemployed”. Finally, “German youth [who do not go to university] are more 
quickly integrated into work. They have higher rates of employment and are much more likely to have been in 
work “continuously” over the period.”.  
2 For all, OECD, Flexibility in the Labour Market (1986); CEPR, “Unemployment: Choices for Europe” (1995).  
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empirical strategy to assess if the port-of-entry hypothesis is at work, exploiting variation 
across countries and age cohorts.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical model that supports our 
empirical strategy. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy in details. Section 4 presents the 
three micro-dataset we use. In section 5 we propose some descriptive statistics. Section 6 
presents and discusses the empirical results of our estimates. Section 7 concludes. The 
Appendix includes a detailed presentation of the data-sets and a discussion of comparability 
issues. 
 
2. The  Model 
In this section we label jobs as “good” or “bad” in a very loose way. In the section that 
presents the empirical strategy, we will try to clarify these concepts and to link them to 
measurable elements. 
We can sketch the implications of the port of entry hypothesis as: 
() () s t t s t t unemployed good bad good − − > Pr Pr  (1)   
From the job search literature we know that the probability that a worker gets a “good” match 
with a firm is an increasing function of the time he/she has spent on the labour market. If job 
offers arrive at a constant rate, the longer the elapsed time the higher the probability of getting 
a “good” offer. So we can write 
( ) () () 0 ' ; Pr > = e f e f good  (2) 
where e is experience.  
This is not enough to generate eq. (1), because it does not discriminate between on the job 
search and search from unemployment. However, if the “quality” of job offers is proportional 
to the worker’s human capital and the latter depreciates during unemployment spells (for 
example Booth et al. 1999 assume the same), then in eq.2 e represents actual experience and 
it implies eq. (1). 
Furthermore, we want to allow for institutions influencing the labour market. In particular we 
want to mimic the effect of policies aiming at easing young workers into employment. The 
effect of such kind of policies is to penalise adult workers with respect to younger ones. 
Hence eq. (2) may become 
() ( )( ) ( ) ; 0 ' ; 0 ' ; , Pr < > = a f e f a e f good  (3) 
where a is age. I.e., the younger the worker is, the higher the probability of getting a “good” 
job; this is the effect of policies targeted to youngsters. Without such policies, age would be 
redundant in eq. (3); in fact the amount of human capital that the worker has accumulated over 
time would be the only thing that matters. This implication might be tested. Notice also that if 
potential experience mattered instead of actual experience, then  () 0 ' > a f  would be the 
empirical implication. This might be tested as well. 
Of course in eq. (3) age may catch just the fact that, conditional on actual experience, the 
younger the person is, the shorter his/her past unemployment spells were. Hence we need to 
control for the difference between experience accumulated in a long-term relationship or in 
several short employment spells alternated to unemployment spells. Furthermore, we expect  
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persistence in “good” or “bad” positions on the labour market, possibly due to segmentation. 
Hence we expect: 
() () s t t s t t temporary good permanent good − − > Pr Pr  (4) 
To encompass eq. (4), i.e. that it is better to have a “long” job than several “short” ones, we 
may specify f(e,a) as sub-additive in e; for example 
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) a e e e e f a e e f a e e f
2






1 β + + = + < +  (5) 
where en are employment spells. This might obviously be tested by  2 : 0 = β H . 
 
If eq. (4) holds conditional on actual experience, i.e. for a given level of general human capital 
accumulated, then this persistence might be due to individual ability (selection) or to 
statistical discrimination against “movers” (“stigma”) 
To identify the effect of age in this model we need either to follow workers in the same 
country over time, say before and after the introduction of policies targeted to young workers, 
or to compare different countries where these policies are/are not attempted.  
Unfortunately micro data sets are available only in a few countries and for relatively limited 
periods of time. Furthermore, they generate serious comparability issues and they limit the 
scope of the empirical analysis that can be performed and the set of hypotheses that may 
actually be tested (for example actual experience is not available in most datasets). 
Because of these data limitations, in this work we propose to deal with a corollary of the port-
of-entry hypothesis.  
We focus on the transition from temporary to permanent jobs. Available data do not allow us 
to deal with the wider issue of comparing transition from temporary to permanent jobs and 
transition from unemployment to permanent jobs. However, we regard the analysis of the 
downside of temporary jobs to which the OECD draws attention, i.e. the of risk of being 
trapped into a series of temporary jobs and unemployment spells, as crucial to assess the 
effectiveness of any policy aimed at promoting temporary jobs for youngsters. 
Our empirical analysis will be based on the implications of the following statement. 
Statement 1: 
If the port-of-entry hypothesis is at work, a relatively high proportion of young people who 
start their working career in temporary jobs will ultimately end up in more permanent jobs 
and better prospects. A similar pattern of upward mobility will be more problematic for adult 
workers. None of this is true in a competitive labour market. 
We would expect adults’ chance of moving into a permanent job after a prolonged spell of 
one or more temporary jobs to be substantially smaller compared to their younger 
counterparts. This because in a segmented labour market, adult (maybe male) workers are 
“insiders”, almost by definition. They hold the most protected set of jobs (in large 
manufacturing unionised firms for example) and usually do not move voluntarily (see Contini 
et al. (1996) for statistics on mobility). People that are supposed to be “insiders” due to their 
observable characteristics, and are on a temporary job instead, are more likely to be at a 
disadvantage on the labour market. They are more likely to carry a stigma because they have 
dropped out of the “insider” set, or because they have never joined it. On top of this, there  
  4 
 
might be the effect of policies that try to help young workers to get a job, making adults 
relatively more expensive to hire. 
As we said, none of this is true in a competitive labour market. Adult movers do not carry any 
stigma because there are no “insiders” and “outsiders”, and there are no policies targeting 
youngsters; hence there should be no variation in workers’ performance on the labour market 
by age. 
 
This idea may be operationalised contrasting two conditional probabilities across different age 





















−  (6) 
As we said we expect these ratios to be bounded at 1, because of persistence. If statement (1) 
holds then in a segmented market the second ratio should be closer to 1 than the first, i.e. 
young workers should carry less stigma due to the fact that they are movers. In a competitive 
market we should not estimate any significant difference between the two ratios. 
An exception might be represented by countries where the transition of youth into 
employment is governed via a highly institutionalised mechanism, as the apprentice system
4. 
There we should expect young drop outs to carry a stigma as well. 
 
3. Empirical  strategy 
3.2. Foreword 
In the previous section we used some slippery concepts, like “good / bad” jobs, stigma, ability, 
that need to be discussed. 
First, we cannot observe “good” jobs as auspicious. Our empirical device is to judge the 
quality of a job “ex post”.  
Statement 2: 
Conditional on individual ability, in a segmented labour market: by definition, a good job is 
not easily dominated by other offers; furthermore it implies some degree of security, and 
hence it will last. On the contrary, a bad job has a low degree of job security and it is easily 
dominated by other offers, hence it is less likely to last. None of this is true in a competitive 
labour market. 
In fact “short” jobs are likely to be the effect of job shopping activity for young workers, the 
effect of marginality on the labour market for adults. They are likely to imply little protection, 
little money. On the contrary, “good” jobs bring higher pay, higher protection, higher expected 
wage growth. Again, none of this is true in a more competitive labour market. 
                                                 
3 A more extensive conditioning event could be a sequence of “short” jobs till (t-T). 
4 See below for a discussion of this point.  
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Hence we use observed completed (not elapsed) duration of employment spells to separate 
“good” and “bad” jobs
5. In what follows, therefore, we shall replace “good” with “long-
duration job”, and temporary / bad with “short jobs”. 
Furthermore, we have been using “bad” and “temporary” to indicate the same kind of job. Of 
course this is not strictly correct. However, it is close to reality in a segmented market. In 
addition, they both will be labelled “short” in the empirical analysis, because our aim is to 
point at the precarious condition the worker is in, regardless of the institutional nature of the 
agreement (fixed term or open-ended contract). 
 
It is clear that no exogenous threshold that we can pick up to separate “short” and “long” 
employment spells is going to be fully satisfactory. On the other hand it is not the object of 
this paper to estimate a model on employment duration. Hence we choose the most suitable 
threshold given the nature of the data we are going to use. “Short employment spells” are 
defined as those that lasted less than 12 months.  
 
Second, we need counterfactuals to define “stigma”. The lack of accepted benchmarks makes 
it difficult to reach strong conclusions in regard to the “efficiency” of labour markets. Cross-
country comparisons may help to highlight the effect of different labour market institutions on 
mobility and on the soundness of the port-of-entry hypothesis, even if suitable micro data are 
available only in a few countries, and no data were available before the Eighties. We study 
three countries with markedly different institutions.  
Italy is our main point of interest, because of the ongoing debate about youth unemployment 
and policies to tackle it. We have evidence of a segmented labour market (see Contini et al 
1996), and we expect a strong stigma on adult movers. We expect stigma to be large among 
adults because short employment spells are usually confined to certain sectors (construction, 
trades, seasonal activities including manufacturing), are frequent in particular regions (South), 
and among less skilled workers. On the other hand, long duration jobs are frequent among 
prime-age and mature workers
6. Short employment spells are numerous and highly 
concentrated in a relatively small hard core of prime-age and mature workers. Thus 
persistence in “short” jobs is a likely occurrence, and the transition from short to long jobs 
much more problematic than the transition from “long” to “long” jobs, especially for adult 
workers.  
In the United Kingdom there is the most flexible labour market in Europe. We consider it as 
our benchmark case, in which none of what we expect to be true in a segmented labour market 
should hold. In particular we expect no stigma on anybody in the UK. Of course this is not 
strictly true; Booth et al. (1999) find evidence of persistence in unemployment status (those 
previously unemployed are more likely to become unemployed again). On the other hand, we 
will focus on employed enjoying short versus long employment spells; even if the two things 
are obviously related it does not imply persistence in holding “short” jobs. Hence, in the UK, 
                                                 
5 A satisfactory characterisation of a “good” job requires at least two elements: pay and duration. At this stage, 
we shall have to content ourselves with duration, as pay is observed in our databases, but not as to easily allow 
comparative analysis. 
6 Contini, Malpede, Pacelli, and Rapiti, (1996); Burgess (1998). In Burgess 1998 tables C and D, Italy ranks 
second in nine countries for the share of jobs with incomplete spells over 10 and 20 years.  
  6 
 
where the extent of labour market regulation is low and flexibility high, we expect little 
persistence among both youth and adults employees on short employment spells. 
Finally, Germany is a regulated labour market, there is a famous and allegedly efficient 
apprentice system; hence we expect to find evidence of stigma also on young workers (i.e. 
those that do not complete the apprentice training)
7. In fact a young person who has completed 
a training period as an apprentice, will have a large advantage on the job market over an 
individual of the same age who has not. German companies recruit apprentices at age sixteen 
or seventeen and train them for two or three years. About two-thirds of all teenagers currently 
participate in the system (Munch, 1991). Apprenticeships are offered in all sectors of the 
economy, in blue as well as white collar positions and receive both on-the-job and classroom 
training. Thus “training-on-the-job” in Germany takes place mainly via internal labour 
markets. A short employment spell is unlikely to denote a completed apprenticeship period 
and hence the transition to a long spell is unlikely.  
 
To summarise, we expect the difference between  ()







−  and 
()







−  to be particularly large in Germany, among youth, and in Italy, 
among adults.  
Table 1 here 
 
Third, we need to disentangle the effect of self-selection, i.e. of unobserved individual ability, 
from the effect of what we call stigma. 
To deal properly with the issue of self-selection versus stigma, we should allow for individual 
fixed effects. This is not a straightforward thing to do in this context. Ideally, to control for 
unobservable individual characteristics, we should condition on initial conditions (see Meghir 
and Whitehouse (1997) for example). However, the best we can do here, given data 
constraints that do not allow us to use proper instruments, is to control for the status in which 
we first observe the worker (i.e. on a “long” or “short” employment spell). We acknowledge 
that this is not perfect, because we control for something that is the outcome of an ongoing 
process, hence it might be endogenous (see Both and al. 1999 for a more complex 
econometric approach). 
 
3.3. Estimation  method 
According to statement 1, young people in short-lived jobs should stand a better chance of 
finding - some time thereafter - a “good job” compared to their older colleagues. We 
investigate the issue in two different ways. 
First, we select two sub-samples: workers on a short employment spell in t, workers on a long 
employment spell in t. For each country we estimate a binary logit model for two transition 
                                                 
7 Mertens (1999) finds some evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
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probabilities, aimed at measuring and controlling the factors behind the transition from the 
initial state in t to “long” in t+3.  
()










Estimated probabilities for various age-groups, sex, period and industry are generated, holding 
everything else constant. The probability ratios  
()









+  and  ()










are computed. Our prior expectations are as follows: 
Italy  P-RATIO (young)   >  P-RATIO (adults) 
Britain  P-RATIO (young)   =  P-RATIO (adults) 
Germany  P-RATIO (young)   <=  P-RATIO (adults) 
 
Second, we estimate one multinomial logit for each country and time period, with all workers 
sampled at time t. Three outcomes are possible, labelled “long”, “short”, “out”.  
“Short” is the baseline category, and we focus on the estimated coefficients of the outcome 
“long”, i.e. on the relative probability of getting a “long” employment spell at time t+3 with 
respect to a “short” one, controlling for the effect of the third outcome (“out” of the database, 
to unemployment, self-employment, out of the labour force, or to the public administration). 











The explanatory variables include a quadratic in age and a dummy for the initial state (“short” 
or “long” employment spell), also interacted with the quadratic in age
8. If there is persistence, 








, i.e. the probability to move to a “long” job in t+3 is lower than the probability to get 
another “short” job in t+3 if the worker holds a “short” job in t, given that the worker has not 
gone out of the sample in t+3. If statement 1 holds, we should estimate a negative coefficient 
of “short at t” interacted with age. That would imply  0 * ln











iL β , i.e. the 
older the worker the more difficult to move from a “short” to a “long” job in three years time. 
 
Finally, we add controls for gender, industry, skill level (Italy), education (Germany and UK), 
firm size, wage quartile, geographical area, all measured at time t. We will briefly discuss also 
their effect on the estimated probabilities. We are confident that all the right hand-side 
variables are exogenous, with the possible exception of the industry and wage quartile in 
                                                 
8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.  
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which each individual is found in the initial year. No test or correction is made for this, 
because of the lack of proper instruments.  
 
4. The  Data 
This work compares three countries, using different data sources. For all countries we restrict 
attention to the manufacturing, construction and private service sectors. In this section we 
describe the dataset; in the appendix we address issues of data comparability. 
ITALY.  
We use a large random sample of Italian employees of private firms (excluding agriculture) 
observed between 1985 and 1996. The source is an administrative database (Social Security) 
that allows to observe all the individuals' employment spells, including the very short ones. It 
excludes the public sector (less interesting from the point of view of this study), self 
employment and – obviously – the black economy. We observe all individuals who work at 
least one day during year t as employees of private firms, and then select those who have 
experienced at least one non–part-time “short employment spell” (lasting less than 12 months) 
during year t, hereinafter labelled “short spell”. 
BRITAIN. 
The BHPS (British Household Panel Survey)
9 started in 1991 as an annual survey of each 
adult (more than 16 years old) member of a nationally representative sample of more than 
5,000 households, making a total of about 10,000 individual interviews. There are user-
friendly files generated by the project to make access to the BHPS work history data. These 
files are spells file. That is, for each variable of interest, it is represented its value for each 
month from January 1900 (month 1) to December 1996 (month 1164).
10 Using such spell file 
it is possible to compute the tenure at each employer. To obtain the same coverage of the 
Italian dataset we first select dependent workers of private firms, and then all individuals 
experiencing at least one “short spell” in year t. 
GERMANY 
The GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) is a longitudinal dataset which began in 1984 
with a sample of about 6,000 households in West Germany. In June 1990 the GSOEP was 
extended to the GDR. Once a year all members of the households aged 16 or older are 
questioned. The questions cover economic and social conditions of all household members. 
Many questions refers to the time of interview, but there are also some retrospective 
information and spells files. To obtain the same coverage of the Italian dataset from the 
GSOEP we select dependent workers of private firms, and from these we focus on the 
individuals experiencing at least one short spell in year t.
11 
                                                 
9 The BHPS data used in this analysis come from “Combined Work-Life History Data Files” made available 
through the ESRC Data Archive. 
10 In most cases the majority of early values is missing, but it is necessary to go back this far for some of the older 
respondents.  
11 We use the ARTKALEN file which reports the answer to the question “Please think about the entire previous 
year: we have made a sort of calendar. On the left, we have written things that could have happened last year. 
Please go through the entire list and check each month, in which, for example, you were employed or  
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5. Descriptive  Analysis 
5.1.  Who holds SHORT jobs? 
We focus here on the characteristics of workers holding “short” jobs. In particular, we 
compare the distribution of short-job holders by observable characteristics to the distribution 
of these characteristics in the population. The latter is estimated on a cross section of people 
working in May of year t (Italy), or at time of interview (Germany and UK). 
It is worth noting again that our definition of short employment spell is based on completed 
tenure, not on elapsed tenure at the time of the survey (as in Burgess 1998). Hence our 
statistics are not comparable to those obtained from answers to the question “for how long 
have you been with your current employer?”. 
A significant fraction of employees holds “short” jobs (table 2). In Germany there is the 
lowest percentage of “short” jobs among the three countries: about 7% in Western Germany 
before unification, almost 11% in the unified country in 1994. In the UK the percentage is 
highest, up to 19% in 1994. Italy is in an intermediate position, with a peak at 16.4% in 1989. 
Focusing on age and gender, (table 2) we notice that people experiencing short employment 
spells are more likely to be young; this is true in every country and period.  
In Italy 21% of young women and 27% of young men, in Britain 29% of young women and 
26% of young men hold a “short” job during the period. Differences by gender are relevant in 
UK and Italy: while in the former women are more likely to hold “short” jobs, the reverse is 
true in Italy. These percentages control for the lower participation of women in Italy's labour 
market, but show the effect of the selection process: only “better” female workers participate 
and they are more likely to get a “good” job. Others are probably employed in the Italian black 
economy, not observable in this dataset. 
Among prime age workers, the number of short-job holders is still relatively “high”: about 
10% in Italy and Germany, even higher in the UK. While there is no difference between 
Italian women and men in this respect, in the other two countries women are much more 
likely to experience short employment spells. 
Even among older workers (above 45 years old) we find significant percentages of people 
experiencing short employment spells: about 6% in Italy and Germany, about 14% in the UK 
in 1994. No differences by gender can be detected in the UK, while in Italy and Germany 
“older” women are more likely to hold “short” jobs than “older” men. 
 
Turning to wages (table 3) we find, as expected, that workers on short employment spells earn 
lower mean wages than the population and that their wage distribution is shifted to the left. 
                                                                                                                                                          
unemployed, etc. Please make sure you answer for each month”. The respondent would simply check for each 
month, the appropriate activities. To generate the spells, all monthly calendars, from previous years as well, are 
used.  
For our analysis we use a spell (monthly) file which looks at spells of activity, such as work, retirement 
and schooling, over each GSOEP survey year. Each time the spell is interrupted, that spell is terminated and a 
new spell begins.  
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Focusing on median wages (normalised by the population mean of males 30-45) we notice 
that among younger workers the penalisation in terms of wage due to a short employment 
spell is highest in Germany, almost negligible in Italy, with the UK in intermediate position. 
Among prime age and older workers the penalisation is highest in Germany, negligible in the 
UK, with Italy in-between.  
 
These data suggest that German workers are the least likely to hold “short” jobs but if they do 
they bear the maximum penalty. On the contrary UK workers can easily experience short 
employment spells, but the penalty - measured by wages - is negligible.  
These represent two extreme cases: on the one hand, a well regulated market in Germany, 
with a high number of well paid “insiders” who hold stable jobs, along with the low-paid 
“outsiders”, concentrated in “short” jobs. On the other hand a very flexible market in Britain, 
where wage dispersion is high and job security low, but where “outsiders” (if any) do not pay 
a high price in terms of pay. Italy is again an intermediate case, where both wage-penalty and 
job “insecurity” are significant. 
 
5.2.  Persistence and Transitions 
Prior to the empirical test of the PEH-2, we present some descriptive statistics on the 
destination at year (t+3) of workers in short employment spells at year (t) and of workers in 
long employment spells at (t), for each of the sub-periods considered in this study (table 4). 
Workers in short or long employment spells in 1986 and 1991 are classified according to their 
state in 1989 and 1994 respectively. There are three possibilities: i) still in short (long) 
employment spell; ii) moved into a long (short) spell; iii) moved “out” of the set of employees 
of private firms. 
In order to define movements into the “out” state, we have proceeded as follows: for both 
Germany and UK all people classified as “dependent employee” at the beginning of each 
observation period (1986 and 1991) and either no longer in the same status or no longer in the 
panel, are assigned to a state denominated “out”.
12 In this way we establish a meaningful 
comparability with Italy, whose database includes only dependent workers. It has been pointed 
out elsewhere
13 that, for workers aged 25 through 50, holding short term jobs and earning 
modest pay, the vast majority of movements out of dependent work have a strongly negative 
connotation, even when they do not coincide with outright unemployment. In Italy exit from 
the panel may signify also work in the irregular, black or grey economy. In Germany and the 
UK such positions, while not as numerous as in Italy, are probably declared by respondents to 
the household survey.  
Consider workers that initiate from a short spell (see Table 4): Italy and Germany look 
surprisingly similar in 1986-89: almost 50% of workers are “out” by 1989; 12-15% are still in 
short spells; the rest have moved to a long spell. The similarity of Italy and Germany holds in 
                                                 
12 The states other than dependent employment are: unemployment, self-employment, out-of-the labour force, 
other, both in the GSOEP and in the BHPS. 
13 See Contini and Villosio, (1998). In particular, the probability of a move towards self-employment is not 
negligible only for job holders who are in the upper tail of the wage distribution. This is certainly not the case for 
workers holding “short” jobs.  
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1991-94, with a slight improvement of prospects for the Italian workers and considerably 
worse prospects for the Germans (as we shall see, this is not the only trace of post-
unification). British workers do better on all counts: fewer drop “out”, many more move into 
long spells. 
Only small changes are noticeable in the two sub-periods for individuals who start in long 
spells: persistence in long spells is higher and the frequency of moves “out” lower in Italy than 
Germany. Mobility (in all directions) is higher in Britain. 
Tables 5a and b display the frequencies of “out” movements, given sex, age and initial state. 
The following regularities deserve to be mentioned. Not unexpectedly, P (out | long) is much 
lower than P (out | short) for all countries and cuts of the sample. P (out | long) is always U-
shaped with respect to age: the probability of a transition to “out” for workers holding a long 
job is lower at prime age, higher at young and mature age. P (out | short) increases with age in 
Italy in both sub-periods, and in Germany after unification (for men only). It is U-shaped in 
Germany (before unification), and in the UK. The similarity between Italy and Germany finds 
here additional support.  
Tables 6a and b relate to persistence issues, and display the transitions ending into “short”, by 
sex and age. The reading is very much in line with the previous tables. The probability of 
being trapped in a short spell (i.e. a transition from short (t) to short (t+3)) is many times 
higher than that of a transition from long (t) to short (t+3) both for Italy and Germany. The 
lower degree of labour market regulation in the UK makes the difference. The likelihood of a 
bad transition (for men only) increases dramatically from pre-unification to post-unification 
Germany, while the up-cycle is evident in Italy. The transitions to a short spell are inversely 
related to age, regardless of the origin. 
 
6.  Results: Testing the port of entry hypothesis 
We present with some details the results of the binary logit estimation. Results of the 
multinomial logit estimation are still very preliminary and will be briefly presented at the end 
of this section. 
6.1.  Binary logit estimation 
The estimated models are simple reduced forms of binary logit specifications: in the first 
model all sub-sample individuals are in short employment spells at time (t); in the second one 
all are in long employment spells at time (t). We estimate the probability to be either in a long 
employment spell in t+3, or not (i.e. “short” and “out” are considered together). Both models 
include the following regressors: gender, age and age square (t), industry (t), skill level (t) 
(only Italy), education (t) (Germany and UK only), firm size (t), wage quartile (t), 
geographical area. The dependent variables are the two transition probabilities specified 
above. Estimation is performed separately for each country and three year-period. In addition 
we estimate a version with the three countries pooled together.  
Overall significance is moderately good in Italy (between 67% and 73% of concordants; 
Kruskal-Goodman's gamma above 0.35); modest in Germany and the UK (between 55% and 
64% of concordants; Kruskal-Goodman's gamma between 0.20 and 0.30). Here is a summary 
of significant results (details on the regressions are available in the appendix).  
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Dependent variable: Pr [LONG (t+3) | SHORT (t), X ] 
1986-89 (Italy and Germany) 
A strong impact of age (positive) and age square (negative) in both countries. As expected, the 
transition is easier sometime after entry in the labour market and declines near prime age. 
While in Italy the peak of the hump is reached around 25 years of age, in Germany the curve 
turns downwards at age 35. The trade sector reduces the likelihood of the transition. Gender is 
not significant in Germany, while women are penalised in Italy. Blue collar jobs have a 
negative impact (observable only in Italy). Transitions are more difficult for workers at small 
firms in Italy; no impact in Germany. No regional differences in Germany (only West 
Germany); very significant differences in Italy, with the North-East leading the transition and 
the Islands trailing behind. Last but not least, education (observable only in Germany) is 
negatively signed, somewhat above significance. Here there could be a problem linked to the 
endogeneity of initial conditions: a highly educated person who takes up a short (presumably 
“bad”) job early in his life, may have a particularly hard time in “reasserting” his status later in 
his career. 
 
1991-94 (Italy, Germany and UK) 
Age and age square have the same sign and magnitude as in the Eighties in Italy and 
Germany; they are not significant in UK. Trades and construction reduce the likelihood of the 
transition in Italy, no impact elsewhere. Women are penalised in Italy, while they have better 
chances of upward mobility in Britain; again no impact in Germany. Blue collar jobs have a 
negative impact in Italy (not observable elsewhere). Transitions are easier with jobs at larger 
firms in Italy; not significant elsewhere. The position in the wage distribution produces a 
similar impact on the transition in Italy and Britain, none in Germany: a slight penalisation for 
workers placed in the low tail of the wage distribution in Italy; and a slight advantage for 
those in the upper tail in Britain. Regional differences are significant only in Italy. Education 
is no longer significant in Germany, nor is it in Britain. 
No important differences emerge in the regression estimated after pooling all three countries 
together. The UK dummy is significantly positive (confirming all descriptive statistics), while 
there is no significant difference between Germany and Italy.  
 
Dependent variable: Pr [LONG (t+3) | LONG (t), X ] 
1986-89 (Germany and Italy) 
As above, we find a strong impact of age (positive) and age square (negative) in both 
countries. Here too, the transition is more likely to occur as one approaches prime age and 
declines thereafter. Gender reduces the likelihood of the transition in both countries. In the 
trades and construction sectors, the transition becomes more difficult in Italy; the service 
industries make it easier in Italy and less likely in Germany. Blue collar jobs impact 
negatively in Italy. Workers at small firms are less likely to make the transition in Italy and 
Germany. No regional differences in Germany (only West Germany); very significant 
differences in Italy as above: the North-East leads the transition and the Islands trail behind. 
Education (observable only in Germany) is not significant. Low initial earnings reduce the  
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probability of transition in Italy; in Germany the same result is seen where earnings are 
missing variables (detected by a dummy). 
 
1991-94 (Italy, Germany and UK) 
As above, there is a strong impact of age (positive) and age square (negative) in all three 
countries, indicating that the transition occurs mainly as one approaches prime age. Women 
are penalised in Italy and Germany, not in Britain. Jobs in the service industries are more 
likely to induce long spells in Italy and Germany. Blue collar jobs have a negative impact on 
the transition in Italy. Transitions are easier with jobs at larger firms in Italy; not significant 
elsewhere. The position in the wage distribution has the same impact on the transition in Italy 
and Britain, but not in Germany: a slight penalisation for workers placed in the low tail of the 
wage distribution and a slight advantage for those in the upper tail. Regional differences are 
significant only in Italy. Education positively affects the transition in Germany, but not in 
Britain.  
 
In extreme synthesis, the strongest inference restricts to three points: i) the humped shape 
impact of age in all countries; ii) the remarkable regional differences in Italy versus the non-
significance of territorial dimension in UK and Germany; iii) the gender differentials, present 
in Italy across all specifications. 
6.2.  What does the P-RATIO reveal? 
Table 7 shows the estimated transition probabilities for one illustrative benchmark. 
Recall the basic interpretation of the p-ratio: if it is close to one, there is no stigma attached to 
short duration jobs; the smaller the p-ratio, the higher the penalisation. 
Tables 8a and b show the p-ratio computed for different age-groups (same benchmark as 
above) in the three countries, plus West Germany (excluding the Eastern Laenders) after 
unification. The main results are as follows. 
The p-ratio is very close to one for British women; high, but not as close to one for British 
men. It is, instead, much smaller in Italy and Germany, especially post-unification. 
The p-ratio is decreasing in age in Italy, for both men and women and in both sub-periods.  
The p-ratio is humped-shaped in Germany pre-unification (1986-89), increasing through age 
30-35 and decreasing from then onwards. It is decreasing in age in Germany post-unification 
(1991-94), whether or not workers of the Eastern Laenders are retained in the sample.  
The age decreasing pattern is present also in the UK but only to a very slight degree. 
 
The conclusion of our test suggests that statement (1) holds in Italy, and marginally in the UK. 
It did not hold in Germany before unification in line with our priors, but it does after 
unification. 
 
We can compare our main results with Booth et al 1999 on the UK and Mertens 1999 on 
Germany. The overall picture seems well consistent.  
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The first study applies sophisticate econometric techniques to disentangle the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity and of state dependence in unemployment persistence in the UK 
over the period 1991-1995. They find evidence of stigma (scarring, in their terminology) 
carried by those previously unemployed, both young and adult workers. They get different 
patterns or no pattern at all by age in different selections of the dataset used in the empirical 
analysis. Hence there is some evidence that the UK market is not perfectly competitive; 
however, no clear pattern by age emerges in their study as well. 
Mertens 1999 analyses the pattern of job stability in Germany over time. He finds some 
evidence of segmentation of the German labour market (insiders and outsiders in his 
terminology): outsiders face higher risk of job termination compared to insiders. Also Mertens 
defines short and long employment spells (more or less than 12 months), and he finds that the 
probability of holding a “short job” has increased after German unification. Another piece of 
evidence of a changed labour market after unification. 
 
6.3.  Multinomial logit estimation 
Extremely preliminary results on the period 1991-1994 are presented in the appendix. At this 
stage we may only conclude from this experiment that there is evidence of the port of entry 
being at work only in Italy. Most of the other coefficients are not significant, either in Italy or 
in the other two countries.  
This preliminary result is consistent with the binary logit estimation results about Italy and the 
UK, not about Germany.  
 
7. Conclusions 
It is only evident that the institutional setting (and upsetting) has a remarkable impact. Where 
labour market regulation is loose, as in Britain, the in-and-outs from “short” jobs are slightly 
penalising, with age dependence showing only if we contrast the extreme age-groups (20-25 
versus 45-50). It is neutral among women (the P-RATIO is close to one), again with a minor 
difference between the youngest and the oldest. 
In Italy, where regulation is tighter, the port of entry hypothesis appears to be fairly well 
grounded: “short” jobs in the regular (official) economy are much less of a stigma for young 
workers on their way to better employment positions, as they appear for adult workers. “short” 
jobs provide forms of training-on-the-job for the young that firms appear to prize by hiring 
under long(er)-term contracts young workers who have held “short” jobs in the past.
14  Gender 
differences are small. 
In Germany the traditional “port-of-entry” to good jobs is its deservedly famous apprentice 
system, credited with providing German industry with highly skilled and fungible workforce. 
Training-on-the-job takes place mainly via internal labour markets, thus removing the need 
for the “port of entry” to operate efficiently. This pattern seems to be in line with our 
                                                 
14 There was some evidence in the Seventies and early Eighties that small firms in certain branches of 
manufacturing (metal-working and engineering) played an important role in providing training-on-the-job for 
young workers who would eventually move on to larger firms. See Becattini (1998).  
  15 
 
empirical observation in the 1986-89 period. But in the next 1991-94 sub-period, things 
change quite drastically: the “port of entry” seems to be at work also in Germany, even after 
exclusion of the Eastern Laenders.  Has the apprentice system lost appeal after unification, or 
drastically reduced its effectiveness in the aftermath of the new, strongly segmented, labour 
market of unified Germany? For the time being we can do no better than emphasise the 
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9. Tables 
Table 1: Institutions and P-ratios in Italy, Germany and UK 
 
 ITALY  UK  GERMANY 
Extent of regulation in L.M  High  Low  High 
Which jobs are observed ?  Regular jobs (covered 
by compulsory social 
security) 
all jobs  all jobs 
Relevant institutions  No dual apprentice 
system 
No dual apprentice 
system 
With dual apprentice 
system 
Youth  A substantial advantage 
being already on 
regular payroll, even 
for short periods 
A modest advantage for 
those with long L.M. 
experience 
Apprentice period is an 
absolute MUST 
Adults  A major stigma for all 
workers in short 
(regular) jobs, skilled or 
unskilled 
Some advantage for the 
skilled occupations. 
Little or none for the 
unskilled 
Some advantage for 
the skilled 
occupations. Little or 
none for the unskilled 
P-RATIO  P(young) > P(adults)  P(young) = P(adults)  P(young) < P(adults) 
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Table 2 
Percentages of short job spells on population by age and gender 
 
    Female     Male     all 
  year  /  age  15-30 30-45 >45 15-30  30-45 >45 all 
             
ITALY  1986  21.15 6.81 6.90  27.67 8.26 6.16  12.8 
GERMANY 1986  16.60  9.90  3.90 15.30  2.60  2.60 7.5 
            
ITALY  1989  26.98 10.66 10.62 34.28 10.97  7.30  16.4 
GERMANY 1989  12.20  5.60  3.70 17.90  2.00  1.50 6.7 
            
UK  1991  29.4 16.4  8.0 24.4 12.7  9.3  15.6 
ITALY  1991  18.6 8.2 7.1  25.6 9.8 6.7  14.5 
GERMANY  1991  15.2 9.8 7.0  14.7 4.0 4.1  8.3 
            
UK  1994  28.5 22.5 15.1 28.1 16.2 14.3  18.9 
ITALY  1994  16.6 6.5 4.5  21.2 8.1 6.0  11.4 
GERMANY  1994  26.1 12.9  6.1 21.4  5.8  3.7  10.8 
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Table 3 
Wage distribution of workers on short employment spells and in the population, as 
percentage of the population mean of males 30-45 years. (1991) 
 
  Population      Short     
  mean  q25 median q75 mean q25 median q75 
ITALY             
Female  15-30  0.64  0.54 0.62 0.71  0.65  0.51 0.60 0.70 
Female  30-45  0.80  0.61 0.72 0.90  0.78  0.56 0.65 0.77 
Female  >45  0.81  0.62 0.72 0.89  0.69  0.52 0.66 0.77 
Male  15-30  0.71  0.58 0.67 0.81  0.68  0.52 0.64 0.80 
Male 30-45  1.00  0.72 0.87 1.11  0.85  0.64 0.78 0.91 
Male  >45  1.18  0.76 0.92 1.22  0.90  0.67 0.83 0.98 
GERMANY             
Female  15-30  0.55  0.36 0.53 0.66  0.29  0.15 0.24 0.35 
Female  30-45  0.59  0.36 0.56 0.73  0.46  0.27 0.46 0.63 
Female  >45  0.59  0.34 0.51 0.73  0.12  0.08 0.17 0.28 
Male  15-30  0.69  0.56 0.71 0.85  0.46  0.19 0.35 0.56 
Male 30-45  1.00  0.77 0.92 1.16  0.73  0.47 0.73 0.85 
Male  >45  1.11  0.77 0.92 1.21  0.71  0.65 0.73 0.86 
U K              
Female  15-30  0.46  0.28 0.41 0.60  0.41  0.17 0.37 0.59 
Female  30-45  0.46  0.19 0.36 0.64  0.41  0.15 0.33 0.62 
Female  >45  0.40  0.16 0.32 0.53  0.48  0.21 0.39 0.63 
Male  15-30  0.63  0.41 0.58 0.80  0.56  0.30 0.50 0.71 
Male 30-45  1.00  0.65 0.88 1.18  0.99  0.65 0.87 1.18 
Male  >45  0.88  0.59 0.78 1.08  0.88  0.51 0.73 1.05 
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Table 4 
Destination at year (t+3) of workers in short and long employment spells at year (t) 
 
  From Short to  From Long to 
Country, Period  Long Short Out  Long Short Out 
Germany 1986-89  0.42 0.12 0.46 0.69 0.02 0.29 
Italy 1986-89  0.37 0.15 0.48 0.78 0.03 0.19 
Germany 1991-94  0.32 0.20 0.48 0.69 0.06 0.25 
Italy 1991-94  0.39 0.11 0.50 0.79 0.02 0.18 
UK 1991-94  0.54 0.21 0.25 0.61 0.13 0.26 
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Table 5 
Freq. (out (t+3) | state (t), age, gender)   
 
a) 1986-1989  
 Italy  Germany 
 P(out|long)  P(out|short)  P(out|long)  P(out|short) 
female       
age<30  0.21 0.48 0.30 0.52 
age30-45 0.16 0.62 0.23 0.42 
age>45  0.36 0.75 0.30 0.59 
       
male       
age<30  0.19 0.44 0.18 0.37 
age30-45 0.11 0.45 0.15 0.31 
age>45  0.30 0.61 0.31 0.38 
 
 
b) 1991-1994  
 Italy  Germany  UK 
  P(out|long) P(out|short) P(out|long) P(out|short) P(out|long) P(out|short) 
female          
age<30 0.18 0.47 0.29 0.49 0.19 0.28 
age30-45  0.14 0.57 0.20 0.41 0.13 0.17 
age>45 0.35 0.72 0.32 0.54 0.18 0.25 
          
male          
age<30 0.16 0.47 0.19 0.42 0.09 0.22 
age30-45  0.10 0.48 0.16 0.46 0.05 0.15 
age>45 0.33 0.65 0.33 0.73 0.21 0.32 
 
  
  21 
 
Table 6 
Freq. (short (t+3)| state(t), age, gender) 
 
a) 1986-1989  
 Italy  Germany 
 P(short|long)  P(short|short)  P(short|long)  P(short|short) 
female       
age<30 3.26  12.46 3.04  8.4 
age30-45 1.64  9.76  2.05  12.04 
age>45 1.39  8.61 1.32 0.20 
       
male       
age<30 5.05  15.66 2.63 19.0 
age30-45 2.06 19.39  0.84  8.69 
age>45 1.45  14.27 0.42 11.29 
ALL  2.64  15.07  1.64 12.13 
 
 
b) 1991-1994  
 Italy  Germany  UK 
  P(ss|long) P(ss|short)  P(ss|long) P(ss|short)  P(ss|long) P(ss|short) 
female          
age<30 3.05  9.47  11.39 17.06 20.11 21.62 
age30-45  1.55 9.62  7.0 20.08  14.91  23.56 
age>45  1.09 4.91  3.5 12.52  8.22  14.29 
          
male          
age<30 4.16 12.34 8.79 26.74  19.04  24.08 
age30-45  2.0  13.03 4.58 20.39  12.77 18.0 
age>45  1.48 8.76 3.61  14.16  11.15  13.04 
ALL  2.46  11.24  5.98 19.72  13.53  20.82 
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Table 7 
Estimated transition probabilities 
 
 P(long|long)  P(long|short) 
Italy 1986-89  0.91  0.53 
Germany 1986-89  0.84  0.68 
    
Italy 1991-94  0.92  0.53 
Germany 1991-94  0.80  0.37 
UK 1991-94  0.66  0.50 
Benchmarks: 
 
Italy: 30-35 years old, male, white collar, earning daily wage in the 2nd quartile of the distribution, employed in 
manufacturing firm, with 20-200 employees, location: centre. 
Germany: 30-35 years old, male, with 11 years of schooling, earning monthly wage in the 2nd quartile of the 
distribution, employed in manufacturing firm, with 20-200 employees, location west Germany. 
Britain: 30-35 years old, male, with 11 years of schooling, earning weekly wage in the 2nd quartile of the 
distribution, employed in manufacturing firm, with 20-200 employees, location Centre. 
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Table 8 
P-ratio by age classes  
 
a) 1986-1989 
  Italy 1986  Germany 1986 
 man  woman  man  woman 
 age20-25  0.64  0.58  0.71  0.55 
 age25-30  0.61  0.54  0.78  0.63 
 age30-35  0.59  0.52  0.81  0.66 
 age35-40  0.56  0.49  0.80  0.65 
 age40-45  0.52  0.45  0.75  0.60 
 age45-50  0.49  0.42  0.66  0.49 
 
b) 1991-1994 
  Italy 1991  Germany 1991  Germany 1991 
WEST only 
UK 1991 
  man woman man woman man woman man woman 
  age20-25  0.62 0.60 0.51 0.57 0.35 0.48 0.83 0.99 
  age25-30  0.60 0.57 0.49 0.54 0.34 0.45 0.79 0.94 
  age30-35  0.57 0.55 0.47 0.51 0.32 0.42 0.76 0.91 
  age35-40  0.55 0.52 0.44 0.47 0.29 0.38 0.75 0.90 
  age40-45  0.52 0.50 0.39 0.42 0.24 0.33 0.76 0.91 
  age45-50  0.50 0.48 0.33 0.36 0.19 0.27 0.78 0.92 
  




There are two main issues about comparability: one is the use of administrative databases 
versus surveys (with consequences on coverage and definition of short spells); and the other 
the different timing of the business cycle. 
10.2.1. Databases versus Surveys 
It is important to recall the differences in the data-bases: for Italy it is a panel based on Social 
Security Administration (INPS) administrative files. Hence it includes only “regular” working 
positions in the private sector (excluding agriculture) and in some public administrations. All 
jobs in the unofficial (black/grey) economy go unrecorded in this database. For UK and 
Germany we are using the National Household Surveys, which cover all jobs whether in 
regular payroll or in the unofficial (unregulated, possibly black) economy, where job volatility 
is much higher and short job spells more frequent.  
A problem that may arise in Italy's database is common to many administrative sources: the 
definition of job spell that individuals have in mind and declare in a household survey may 
differ from that observable in the administrative database: if firm A merges with firm B and 
retains all employees, B's employees will seldom report a job change to the interviewer: but in 
the administrative records we would normally find a job change from B to A. Thus the 
frequency of short spells may be overestimated in administrative databases, unless corrections 
are made to exclude these events from count. The Italian database has been corrected 
accordingly, but the control may not be perfect. It is therefore possible that short spells could 
be slightly overestimated in Italy for this reason.  
On the other hand, the structure of Germany's GSOEP does not allow the separation of two 
consecutive employment spells with different employers, unless interrupted by a period of 
unemployment, training or inactivity. Comparability may be somewhat affected also from this 
perspective - short spells being here underestimated and long spells overestimated at both 
ends of the observations period - but, if anything, this will strengthen our conclusions.  
 
10.2.2. The Business Cycle 
We compare Italy and West Germany in the late Eighties; Italy, Germany and the UK in the 
early Nineties. The three countries do not face the same phase of the business cycle. If we 
were to do a sophisticated econometric analysis, we would have to take into explicit account 
the impact of the cycle (the UK anticipates over Italy and Germany). This is a preliminary 
investigation of the PEH where the basic data show differences that are much more structural 
(institution-based) than cycle related. For this reason, there seems to be little scope to go 
beyond the consciousness that the cycle may matter.  
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10.1.  Descriptive statistics and details about the dataset used 
 
To be done.  
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10.2.  Detailed results of the Logit estimates 
Table A: Logit Pr (longt+3 | shortt ) by country 1986-89 
  GER. 1986-89  IT 1986-89 
  Coeff.  s.e.   Coeff.  s.e.  
INTERCPT -1.209  1.767    -0.499  0.242  * 
WOMAN -0.587  0.304    -0.309  0.050  ** 
AGE 0.240  0.098  *  0.056  0.014  ** 
AGE_Q -0.360  0.140  *  -0.113  0.019  ** 
CONSTR -1.677  0.810  *  -0.071  0.061   
COMM -2.225  0.893  *  -0.476  0.053  ** 
SERV  13.946  704.400   0.021 0.084  
CICM  -1.209  0.865   -  -  
SCHOOL -0.185  0.067  **  -  -   
OCCBLUE -  -    -0.320  0.062  ** 
OCCAPPR -  -    -0.245  0.092  ** 
SIZE1 1.719  0.684  *  -0.047  0.055   
SIZE3  0.600  1.010   -0.141 0.088  
SIZEM  1.202  0.843   -  -  
WNQ1  -0.569  0.456   -0.059 0.058  
WNQ3  0.016  0.660   0.107 0.066  
WNQ4  0.050  0.810   -0.018 0.080  
WAGE0  -0.674  0.448   -  -  
NORTH  0.116  0.413       
SOUTH  0.450  0.561       
NORTH-W       0.384  0.063  ** 
NORTH-E -  -    0.485  0.063  ** 
SOUTH       -0.562  0.069  ** 
ISLAND -  -    -0.633  0.083  ** 











-2 LOG L  346.23      14150.41     
Concordant  69.7%     65.1%    














** significant at 1% 
* significant at 5%  
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Table B: Logit Pr (longt+3 | shortt ) by country 1991-94 
  GER 1991-94  ITA 1991-94  UK 1991-94 
  Coeff.  s.e.   Coeff.  s.e.   Coeff.  s.e.  
INTERCPT -2.498  0.931  ** -0.369  0.220    0.292  0.848   
WOMAN 0.031  0.156    -0.148  0.046  **  0.493  0.204  * 
AGE  0.142  0.044 **  0.044  0.013 **  -0.017  0.050   
AGE_Q  -0.227  0.060 **  -0.092  0.018 **  0.033  0.068   
CONSTR -0.210  0.388    -0.285  0.053  **  -0.849  0.429   
COMM 0.248  0.255    -0.292  0.049  **  -0.214  0.238   
SERV -0.335  0.513    -0.094  0.073    -0.033  0.234   
CICM -0.179  0.317              
SCHOOL -0.021  0.023          -0.008  0.029   
OCCBLUE       -0.353  0.055  **       
OCCAPPR       -0.218  0.085  *       
SIZE1 0.313  0.347    -0.086  0.045    -0.381  0.211   
SIZE3 0.036  0.205    0.167  0.071  *  -0.003  0.241   
SIZEM -0.012  0.349               
WNQ1 0.249  0.447    -0.183  0.050  **  0.258  0.260   
WNQ3 0.392  0.684    0.008  0.059    0.756  0.294  * 
WNQ4 0.509  0.616    -0.107  0.071    0.419  0.316   
WAGE0 -0.055  0.441          -0.026  0.299   
NORTH 0.431  0.357               
SOUTH 0.007  0.259               
EAST -0.314  0.708              
NORTH-W      0.384  0.056  **      
NORTH-E      0.519  0.057  **      
SOUTH       -0.213  0.065  **       
ISLANDS       -0.609  0.077  **       
SOUTH-E           -0.230  0.211  
WALES           -0.656  0.450  
SCOTL           -0.038  0.320  







    
5058 
7546 




-2 LOG L  1114.001      16978.488      751.811     
Concordant  60.0%     63.9%    63.4%    


















** significant at 1% 
* significant at 5% 
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Table C: Logit Pr (longt+3 | shortt ) pool of countries 
  Coeff. s.e.   Coeff. s.e.  
INTERCPT  -0.442 0.331   -0.806 0.338  * 
WOMAN  -0.065 0.042   -0.099 0.043  * 
AGE  0.049  0.011 **  0.050  0.012 ** 
AGE_Q  -0.097  0.016 **  -0.097  0.016 ** 
CONSTR  -0.425  0.051 **  -0.282  0.052 ** 
COMM  -0.239  0.046 **  -0.270  0.047 ** 
SERV  -0.062 0.067   -0.074 0.068  
SCHOOL  -0.015 0.014   -0.016 0.017  
OCCBLUE  -0.188 0.269   -0.063 0.272  
OCCAPPR  0.080 0.278   0.098 0.280  
OCCWHITE  0.187 0.271   0.280 0.274  
SIZE1 -0.127  0.043  **  -0.102  0.044  * 
SIZE3 0.174  0.063  **  0.135  0.064  * 
SIZEM  -0.246 0.166   -0.272 0.168  
WNQ1  -0.215  0.048 **  -0.156  0.048 ** 
WNQ3  -0.048 0.056   0.043 0.057  
WNQ4  -0.119 0.067   -0.078 0.068  
WAGE0 -0.463  0.170  **  -0.401  0.171  * 
UK  0.608 0.320  *      
GER  -0.080 0.321       
I_NOR       0.388  0.056  ** 
I_SOU       -0.211  0.065  ** 
I_NE       0.518  0.057  ** 
I_IS       -0.607  0.077  ** 
UK_SOU       0.911  0.365  * 
WALES       0.356 0.533  
SCOTL       1.047  0.437  * 
UK_CEN       0.955  0.342  ** 
D_SOU       0.218 0.327  
D_EAST       -0.251 0.761  
D_WEST       0.182 0.396  











-2 LOG L  18900.901      18900.901     
Concordant  59.7%     63.8%    














** significant at 1% 
* significant at 5%  
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Iteration 0:  Log Likelihood =-58486.202 
Iteration 1:  Log Likelihood =-50844.005 
Iteration 2:  Log Likelihood = -49672.49 
Iteration 3:  Log Likelihood =-49630.002 
Iteration 4:  Log Likelihood =-49629.686 
Iteration 5:  Log Likelihood =-49629.686 
 
Multinomial regression                                  Number of obs =  88779 
                                                        chi2(40)      =17713.03 
                                                        Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Log Likelihood = -49629.686                             Pseudo R2     = 0.1514 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  status |      Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2        | 
   woman |    .038146   .0547447      0.697   0.486      -.0691518    .1454437 
     age |   .1294505    .018577      6.968   0.000       .0930403    .1658607 
   age_q |  -.1528126   .0252442     -6.053   0.000      -.2022904   -.1033348 
   short |   .5074974   .3930203      1.291   0.197      -.2628082    1.277803 
   agexs |  -.1298642   .0248194     -5.232   0.000      -.1785094   -.0812191 
  ageqxs |   .1484939   .0357883      4.149   0.000       .0783501    .2186377 
  constr |  -1.026869    .057558    -17.841   0.000      -1.139681   -.9140578 
    comm |  -.4479846   .0571636     -7.837   0.000      -.5600232    -.335946 
    serv |  -.0084099   .0863872     -0.097   0.922      -.1777257    .1609058 
 occblue |   -.664487   .0679046     -9.786   0.000      -.7975776   -.5313963 
 occappr |  -.6374222   .1015638     -6.276   0.000      -.8364835   -.4383609 
   size1 |  -.1328593   .0506005     -2.626   0.009      -.2320344   -.0336841 
   size3 |    .431243   .0777409      5.547   0.000       .2788736    .5836123 
    wnq1 |  -.2005275   .0569734     -3.520   0.000      -.3121933   -.0888617 
    wnq3 |   .0488201   .0624571      0.782   0.434      -.0735935    .1712337 
    wnq4 |   .1179673    .080235      1.470   0.141      -.0392905    .2752251 
   i_nor |   .0053882   .0655478      0.082   0.934      -.1230832    .1338596 
    i_ne |  -.1383668   .0661551     -2.092   0.036      -.2680284   -.0087052 
   i_sou |  -.4411503   .0707025     -6.240   0.000      -.5797246   -.3025759 
    i_is |  -.6680144   .0827226     -8.075   0.000      -.8301478   -.5058811 
   _cons |   2.250249   .3321301      6.775   0.000       1.599286    2.901212 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3        | 
   woman |   .3100959   .0560076      5.537   0.000        .200323    .4198689 
     age |  -.1588434   .0189909     -8.364   0.000      -.1960649   -.1216218 
   age_q |   .2806922    .025705     10.920   0.000       .2303113     .331073 
   short |  -1.429564   .3924117     -3.643   0.000      -2.198677   -.6604511 
   agexs |   .0960024   .0245878      3.904   0.000       .0478112    .1441937 
  ageqxs |  -.1639538   .0351089     -4.670   0.000       -.232766   -.0951417 
  constr |  -.6959604   .0590589    -11.784   0.000      -.8117138    -.580207 
    comm |  -.3160303   .0585997     -5.393   0.000      -.4308836   -.2011769 
    serv |  -.3644725   .0889234     -4.099   0.000      -.5387592   -.1901858 
 occblue |  -.5366778   .0694886     -7.723   0.000      -.6728729   -.4004827 
 occappr |  -.9958129   .1042971     -9.548   0.000      -1.200232   -.7913943 
   size1 |    .114884   .0519763      2.210   0.027       .0130124    .2167557 
   size3 |   .2694489   .0798019      3.376   0.000       .1130401    .4258577 
    wnq1 |   .1034546   .0583975      1.772   0.076      -.0110024    .2179117 
    wnq3 |   .0060996   .0641265      0.095   0.924       -.119586    .1317852 
    wnq4 |   .0775537   .0819907      0.946   0.344      -.0831451    .2382526 
   i_nor |  -.0808432   .0670431     -1.206   0.228      -.2122454    .0505589 
    i_ne |  -.4284605   .0680446     -6.297   0.000      -.5618255   -.2950955 
   i_sou |  -.0880824   .0719518     -1.224   0.221      -.2291053    .0529405 
    i_is |  -.0988042   .0831962     -1.188   0.235      -.2618657    .0642574 
   _cons |   4.595698   .3404835     13.498   0.000       3.928363    5.263034 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(Outcome status==1 is the comparison group)  




Iteration 0:  Log Likelihood = -6878.821 
Iteration 1:  Log Likelihood =-6351.9387 
Iteration 2:  Log Likelihood =-6328.0044 
Iteration 3:  Log Likelihood =-6327.7678 
Iteration 4:  Log Likelihood =-6327.7677 
 
Multinomial regression                                  Number of obs =   8208 
                                                        chi2(42)      =1102.11 
                                                        Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Log Likelihood = -6327.7677                             Pseudo R2     = 0.0801 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  status |      Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2        | 
   woman |  -.2454291   .0935327     -2.624   0.009      -.4287498   -.0621084 
     age |   .1680162   .0309961      5.421   0.000       .1072649    .2287674 
   age_q |  -.1823363   .0402717     -4.528   0.000      -.2612673   -.1034053 
   short |   1.104967   1.092054      1.012   0.312      -1.035419    3.245353 
   agexs |  -.0978204    .064089     -1.526   0.127      -.2234325    .0277917 
  ageqxs |   .0771814   .0872634      0.884   0.376      -.0938516    .2482145 
  constr |   .1243386   .2027507      0.613   0.540      -.2730455    .5217228 
    comm |  -.0489001   .1368393     -0.357   0.721      -.3171001       .2193 
    serv |   .4220108    .207042      2.038   0.042       .0162159    .8278056 
    cicm |   .0133615   .1590536      0.084   0.933      -.2983779    .3251009 
  school |   .0229442   .0136836      1.677   0.094      -.0038751    .0497635 
   size1 |    .251117   .1864842      1.347   0.178      -.1143854    .6166194 
   size3 |  -.0789841   .1009371     -0.783   0.434      -.2768172     .118849 
   sizem |  -.5554585   .2026629     -2.741   0.006      -.9526706   -.1582465 
    wnq1 |  -.3864966   .1704476     -2.268   0.023      -.7205678   -.0524255 
    wnq3 |  -.0264337   .1940805     -0.136   0.892      -.4068245    .3539572 
    wnq4 |   .2118941   .2029316      1.044   0.296      -.1858444    .6096327 
   wage0 |  -.3024368   .1846492     -1.638   0.101      -.6643425    .0594689 
   d_nor |  -.0188975   .1720938     -0.110   0.913      -.3561951    .3184001 
   d_sou |  -.0941034   .1257903     -0.748   0.454       -.340648    .1524411 
  d_east |  -.4094258   .3050503     -1.342   0.180      -1.007313    .1884618 
   _cons |  -.9471661   .5904158     -1.604   0.109       -2.10436    .2100276 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3        | 
   woman |  -.0102088   .0986166     -0.104   0.918      -.2034938    .1830761 
     age |  -.0927831   .0321906     -2.882   0.004      -.1558755   -.0296907 
   age_q |   .1731439   .0415424      4.168   0.000       .0917224    .2545655 
   short |   .3683203   1.031258      0.357   0.721      -1.652908    2.389548 
   agexs |  -.0196511   .0597564     -0.329   0.742      -.1367715    .0974692 
  ageqxs |   .0071158   .0797855      0.089   0.929      -.1492608    .1634925 
  constr |  -.0174855   .2171864     -0.081   0.936      -.4431631    .4081921 
    comm |  -.1377991   .1464464     -0.941   0.347      -.4248286    .1492305 
    serv |   .1418894   .2214011      0.641   0.522      -.2920489    .5758276 
    cicm |   .1381904    .167451      0.825   0.409      -.1900075    .4663884 
  school |  -.0050047   .0144917     -0.345   0.730      -.0334079    .0233985 
   size1 |   .2528118   .1970694      1.283   0.200      -.1334372    .6390607 
   size3 |   -.062847   .1074808     -0.585   0.559      -.2735055    .1478114 
   sizem |   -.322103   .2107043     -1.529   0.126      -.7350758    .0908698 
    wnq1 |  -.3078064   .1821351     -1.690   0.091      -.6647847    .0491718 
    wnq3 |  -.0962633   .2080526     -0.463   0.644      -.5040389    .3115124 
    wnq4 |  -.0168276   .2162641     -0.078   0.938      -.4406975    .4070422 
   wage0 |  -.2135881   .1961086     -1.089   0.276      -.5979539    .1707776 
   d_nor |  -.2450355   .1844755     -1.328   0.184      -.6066008    .1165298 
   d_sou |  -.2249257   .1335214     -1.685   0.092      -.4866228    .0367714 
  d_east |  -.3577662   .3248968     -1.101   0.271      -.9945522    .2790199 
   _cons |   2.525429   .6181698      4.085   0.000       1.313838     3.73702 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(Outcome status==1 is the comparison group)  




Iteration 0:  Log Likelihood =-2891.5878 
Iteration 1:  Log Likelihood =-2824.5647 
Iteration 2:  Log Likelihood =-2823.5192 
Iteration 3:  Log Likelihood =-2823.5188 
Iteration 4:  Log Likelihood =-2823.5188 
 
Multinomial regression                                  Number of obs =   3203 
                                                        chi2(38)      = 136.14 
                                                        Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Log Likelihood = -2823.5188                             Pseudo R2     = 0.0235 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  status |      Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2        | 
   woman |  -.0208517   .1198497     -0.174   0.862      -.2557527    .2140493 
     age |   .0452053   .0313589      1.442   0.149       -.016257    .1066676 
   age_q |  -.0285918   .0407068     -0.702   0.482      -.1083757    .0511921 
   short |  -.2346903   1.098511     -0.214   0.831      -2.387733    1.918352 
   agexs |  -.0086964   .0666235     -0.131   0.896       -.139276    .1218832 
  ageqxs |   .0090601   .0929801      0.097   0.922      -.1731776    .1912978 
  constr |  -.1963182   .2291061     -0.857   0.392      -.6453579    .2527215 
    comm |   .0421772   .1373902      0.307   0.759      -.2271026     .311457 
    serv |   .1444203   .1289343      1.120   0.263      -.1082862    .3971269 
  school |  -.0109834   .0216453     -0.507   0.612      -.0534074    .0314406 
   size1 |   .0192079   .1217863      0.158   0.875      -.2194888    .2579046 
   size3 |   .0192826   .1246066      0.155   0.877      -.2249417     .263507 
    wnq1 |   .2117896   .1604823      1.320   0.187      -.1027498    .5263291 
    wnq3 |   .0337871    .153821      0.220   0.826      -.2676966    .3352707 
    wnq4 |  -.2474701   .1629223     -1.519   0.129      -.5667919    .0718517 
   wage0 |   .0879326   .1874327      0.469   0.639      -.2794287    .4552939 
  uk_sou |  -.0748001   .1161559     -0.644   0.520      -.3024614    .1528612 
   wales |  -.2849455    .222865     -1.279   0.201      -.7217529    .1518618 
   scotl |  -.0164615     .17858     -0.092   0.927      -.3664718    .3335489 
   _cons |   .3376659   .5927432      0.570   0.569      -.8240894    1.499421 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3        | 
   woman |  -.4176601   .1460189     -2.860   0.004      -.7038519   -.1314682 
     age |   .0031816   .0373846      0.085   0.932      -.0700909    .0764541 
   age_q |   .0238449   .0479907      0.497   0.619      -.0702151    .1179049 
   short |  -.1803946    1.27187     -0.142   0.887      -2.673215    2.312425 
   agexs |    .016599   .0765836      0.217   0.828      -.1335022    .1667002 
  ageqxs |  -.0260045   .1059791     -0.245   0.806      -.2337197    .1817108 
  constr |     .21065   .2556383      0.824   0.410      -.2903918    .7116918 
    comm |   .0300916   .1653569      0.182   0.856       -.294002    .3541853 
    serv |   .0021867   .1575523      0.014   0.989      -.3066102    .3109836 
  school |  -.0066766   .0261637     -0.255   0.799      -.0579565    .0446033 
   size1 |   .2156248   .1458575      1.478   0.139      -.0702507    .5015003 
   size3 |   .0476288   .1523265      0.313   0.755      -.2509257    .3461834 
    wnq1 |   .0089706   .1991338      0.045   0.964      -.3813245    .3992656 
    wnq3 |   .0573684   .1840852      0.312   0.755       -.303432    .4181688 
    wnq4 |   -.441001      .2006     -2.198   0.028      -.8341697   -.0478323 
   wage0 |   .6069108   .2103203      2.886   0.004       .1946906    1.019131 
  uk_sou |  -.1259993   .1416783     -0.889   0.374      -.4036836    .1516851 
   wales |  -.2145229   .2695975     -0.796   0.426      -.7429242    .3138785 
   scotl |   .0734611   .2100545      0.350   0.727       -.338238    .4851603 
   _cons |  -.1151804   .7161436     -0.161   0.872      -1.518796    1.288435 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(Outcome status==1 is the comparison group) 